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Against a background of increased decentralisation in the structure of wage decision 
making, we analyse the effects of unions on the dispersion and persistence of pay 
settlements over the medium term using a longitudinal data set covering British private 
sector establishments over the period 1987-2001. It seems that the union effect of a 
reduction in wage dispersion in pay levels observed in earlier studies is repeated when 
we follow wage changes (settlements) over the medium term. Declining union 
presence seems therefore to account for some of the increase in longer-term wage 
dispersion over the sample period. The increase in aggregate wage settlement 
dispersion seems to have been accompanied by an increase in the permanent rather 




Key words: Pay, Wage Change, Unions, Persistence, Inequality 
 
JEL: J3, J5, J6  
  3 
Everyone's A Winner? Union Effects on Persistence in Private Sector Wage 
Settlements: Longitudinal Evidence from Britain 
 





Since 1979, movements toward greater decentralisation of the structure of 
wage decision making in Britain, both in unionised and non-union establishments, has 
placed the determination of wage settlements increasingly at the level of individual 
firms rather than multi-employer agreements
1. Economic theory, (Calmfors and 
Driffill 1988, Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991), indicates that greater 
decentralisation will be accompanied by greater dispersion in pay levels, as wage 
negotiators focus their attentions on the individual performance of the firm with less 
regard for the external consequences of their actions. Pay levels in Britain have indeed 
become more dispersed, though there is little evidence on whether the distribution of 
the annual wage settlement, the principal source of pay change for most employees in 
Britain, has changed over this period.  
There is a large literature, which documents the presence of lower dispersion in 
wage-levels among unionised individuals than among those who do not belong to a 
trade union, (summarised in Freeman 1980, and Blau and Kahn 1999 for example). It 
is also well known that union presence is in decline in Britain and in the U.S.A. 
Gosling and Machin (1995) estimate that the cross-sectional distribution of individual 
pay in Britain in the 1990 would have been some 15 per cent narrower had the union 
share remained at its 1980 level. DiNardo and Lemieux (1997) estimate that cross-
sectional wage dispersion in the United States would have been some 10 per cent 
                                                           
1.  See Brown and Walsh (1991), Metcalf, Hansen and Charlwood, (2001) for more details on 
decentralisation and union pay dispersion. It remains true, however, that many firms still appear to take 
account of the actions of others when determining the pay settlement, (Brown, Ingram and Wadsworth 
(1999)). 
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lower at the end of the 1980s had the union share remained at its 1981 level
 2. Card 
(1991) finds that workers in the lower earnings quantiles are most affected by the 
decline in density.  
Relatively little is still known, however, about the successive outcome of 
individual company level wage setting through time, (see Gregory, Lobban and 
Thomson (1987) and Leonard (1989), for earlier attempts in Britain and the U.S. 
respectively).  Just as the inequality in pay levels at a point in time may be exacerbated 
or reduced over a longer period of reference
3, so the cumulative pattern of annual wage 
changes may reinforce or reduce settlement variation over time. Furthermore, and for 
the focus of this paper, we still know little about the effect of union presence on the 
pattern of cumulative settlement variation.  
In the standard competitive model it would be impossible in the long run for 
firms to pay wages and, by implication, settlement rates that were consistently higher 
or lower than the average of firms employing similar types of labour. If there are 
economic rents to be shared in certain sectors however, then continuous good, or bad, 
performance could generate consistent winners and losers in the pay round and with it 
the possibility of a wider distribution of settlements over the medium term compared 
to the short run. Equally, if rents are transient – a one off shock to profits for example 
– then this would be consistent with a lack of persistence in settlement outcomes. In 
this context any changes, as in Britain, that focus the determinants of the pay 
settlement on workplace or establishment performance may generate greater or lower 
transience in settlement rankings over time compared to what has gone before. 
   Non-competitive rent-sharing models say little explicitly about the pattern of 
relative settlements over time. Union wage models typically focus on the 
                                                           
2.  See Freeman (1980). 
 
3  For evidence on short and long run inequality using individual pay level data, see Gottschalk and 
Moffitt (1995) for the U.S. or Dickens (2000) for Great Britain.   
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determination of wage levels and on any differential in levels with the non-union 
sector and their maintenance, or not, over time. However if the mean union-wage gap 
is changing over time, (Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) suggest as much for the UK), 
then one of the principal mechanisms through which this change will occur is through 
differences in the annual settlement. Our focus in this paper is on whether union 
coverage reduces dispersion in pay over the medium run compared to the non-union 
sector. Union presence is thought to reduce wage-level dispersion by a combination of 
within and between-firm influences that include a reduction of pay differentials among 
different groups within the firm, fixing a going rate for the job and discouraging 
individual merit pay schemes. If unions reduce dispersion in pay levels and seek to 
maintain the going rate for the job or to maintain differentials then this compression 
effect will also be present in the annual wage settlement, the principal channel of wage 
adjustment for most employees in Britain.  In a unionised setting the existence of 
leapfrogging or pattern bargaining, as settlement groups seek to restore differentials 
with reference to a target outside wage, (see Budd 1992 , Erickson (1996), Marshall 
and Merlo (2004) for example), may also be sufficient to generate the rapid movement 
of groups across the settlement distribution over time. Without such rent-sharing 
mechanisms, movement through the non-union sector settlement distribution may be 
less rapid. How long these relative positions in the settlement distribution persist will 
depend on the individual rent extraction abilities of the individual unions and firms. 
In order to inform the debate on movement across the settlement distribution 
researchers need access to panel data.
4 Our main objective is to use longitudinal data to 
address the influence of unionisation on the cumulative outcome of private sector wage 
settlements over a period in which the unionised sector has shrunk and wage inequality 
                                                           
4 Lemieux (1998) for the U.S. and Andrews, Bell and Upward (1998) for Britain use panel data on 
individuals to address selection effects on the union/non-union differential in wage levels. Neither study  
examines the issue of the persistence of any union effects. 
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grown. Let the non-union wage level for group i is Wi
N = w + εi
N , where w is the 
average wage in the non-union sector and εi is a group specific random component  
with εi
N ~ N(0, σ
2
N) . Similarly, let the union wage level for group i be  
Wi
U = w + k + εi








U . Over time, it  is obvious that if both groups 
receive the same percentage settlement, r, each year then the non-union wage level 
grows by w(1+r)
t and the union wage level grows by (w+k)(1+r)
t.  Hence the absolute 
gap in levels between the two sectors increases but the relative wage gap remains the 
same. The relative union wage mark-up in levels will fall if the mean non-union 
settlement is larger than the mean union settlement.  
  Similarly, if there is lower wage dispersion around the mean union wage level 
then the same percentage increase in the annual settlement across the two sectors will 
increase the absolute dispersion in levels between the two sectors but maintain the 
relative dispersion in levels.
5 If in addition, unions pursue policies that reduce 
dispersion in settlements across groups, then both absolute and relative dispersion in 
pay levels between the two sectors will rise over time.
6  
 To see what evidence there is at the level of the settlement group for wage 
persistence, we examine whether high paying, or correspondingly low paying, groups 
remain high paying - or low paying - over time and whether there appear to be 
differences in behaviour between unionised and non-union groups. The paper is 
organised as follows.  Section 2 describes the wage settlement data we use in this 
investigation. Section 3 describes the headline properties of the dispersion and 
variance characteristics of our data and addresses the extent of persistence in wage 
changes through time. The evidence suggests that less than 1% of settlement groups 
                                                           
5.  This follows from the identity Var(rW) = r
2Var(W) for any constant r 
6.  Gosling and Lemieux (2003) provide evidence on changes in dispersion of pay levels in Britain 
which suggest that both absolute and relative dispersion in levels between union and non-union has 
indeed risen over the period.   
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appear continuously in either the top or bottom quintile of the settlement distribution 
over a five year period. Yet this large variation in settlement rankings is sufficient to 
generate inequalities in pay levels consistent with those observed in Britain over the 
past 15 years.  Section 4 concludes that the absence of wage change persistence in our 
data suggest that we may be able to discount unobserved firm/settlement group effects 
as a potential explanation for rising inequality in Britain. 
 
2. The Data 
The results in this paper are drawn from a longitudinal data set collected at the level 
of the individual settlement unit within establishments by the Confederation of British 
Industry's (CBI) Pay Databank survey. The CBI began the systematic monitoring of 
private sector wage settlements among CBI members and non-members alike, from the 
start of the 1979/80 pay round in August 1979.  The series is used by many 
commentators as a guide to pay pressures in the UK economy. It is one of the longest 
continuous sources of disaggregated firm-level wage data available in Britain, 
providing information on settlement outcomes and pay-setting influences. 
The data are collected in annual “pay rounds” running from 1 August to 31 July the 
following year.  Each round of data contains around 1,500 observations, union and 
non-union, covering around 1.5 million employees, some 8% of all private sector 
employees in Britain. There are, currently, 23 consecutive years of data spanning the 
period August 1979 to July 2002.  When the firm is first included in the sample it is 
asked to give information, where applicable, on its three largest occupational groups 
whose wages are determined, in part, at a local (plant) level
7, along with information 
on other details of the settlement and some (limited) information on the characteristics 
                                                           
7.   Establishments are randomly sampled from the Census of Production. Groups are only included in 
the survey if at least part of the settlement is determined at local level.   
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of the group itself, though not the occupation or skill level
8. The firm is subsequently 
contacted regarding these same groups. The mean number of responses is two groups 
for each establishment.  
Whilst most studies look at the effects of union coverage, Bell and Pitt (1998) 
show that the drop in union coverage has more influence on dispersion than the fall in 
membership. Our data are closer to the idea of union coverage rather than membership. 
Beginning in the sixth wave of the survey, information was gathered on whether the 
settlement group had submitted a pay claim. A positive response to this question is 
used to establish union status in what follows. Around one-third of the union responses 
and one fifth of the non-union responses come from “mixed” establishments, in the 
sense that there are union and non-union settlement groups in the same establishment. 
The union only and mixed observations in the sample have declined at around the 
same rate over the sample period. Around 60% of groups were unionised in 1987/88, 
and 23% in 2001/02. One half of all union groups were in “union only” establishments 
in 1987/88 and in 2001/02. We do not pursue the issue of within-firm spillover effects 
across settlement groups in the same firm and the possible effect on dispersion over the 
medium-run here, leaving this issue to further work, but note that the average cross-
sectional variance of non-union settlements over the sample period is significantly 
smaller for non-union groups if they are observed in “mixed” establishments
9.    
The CBI survey was initially confined to the manufacturing sector, but in 1987 
the survey was extended to cover the entire private sector. We focus mostly on the 
period beginning in 1987 in what follows, though our methodology has also been 
applied to the longer time period covered by manufacturing data
10.  
                                                           
8.   Information on the occupation of the groups has been collected sporadically, but not sufficiently to 
allow us to examine the issue of union impact across skill groups. 
9.   The average non-union (union) variance of real settlements over the sample period is 3.6 (3.6) in 
mixed establishments and 4.7 (4.0) elsewhere. 
10.   Results available from the authors on request.  
  9 
Our analysis focuses on the dispersion in, and persistence of, pay settlements 
over time.  The settlement figure used in this paper is in response to the question 
"Please indicate how much the settlement will increase the earnings of a typical 
employee in this group over the next 12 months.  Please include the effect of bonus 
payments, merit awards etc, if made as part of the settlement"
11.  The wage variable 
therefore includes indirect benefits from shorter hours, longer holidays or changes in 
working arrangements. The mean difference between this measure and the actual base 
settlement increase, available for a shorter period, is quite small at around a third of 
one per cent. The inclusion of drift, however, may mean that we are more likely to 
overstate the degree of transience in our settlement calculations than if increases in 
basic rates were used.  
The real wage variable used is the nominal settlement increase minus the 
inflation rate in the month of the settlement.  The annual sample mean of this real 
variable is often close to zero and there are also many negative real settlement 
increases. Both these factors render many of the conventional relative measures of 
inequality unstable or invalid. We therefore employ measures of dispersion like the 
variance and absolute measures of inequality, namely the absolute Gini and the Kolm 
index, to summarise the real settlement distribution since they can be computed for 
negative values. Unlike relative inequality measures, absolute inequality measures are 
invariant to equal changes in all values, which is appropriate when the mean of the real 
settlement distribution is changing but dispersion around the mean may not be. The 
variance is the only absolute dispersion measure that can be decomposed by sub-
groups, Chakravarty (2000). This property is needed to assess the contribution of 
                                                           
11.  The question remains the same in nature to the detail sought in 'Notification of Pay Settlements' as 
required under the Government's counter inflation policy as set out in the White Paper, The Attack on 
Inflation (Cmnd 6151), (see CBI (1975)) and is intended to capture earnings drift. This question is 
identical to the one used by all previous academic analysis of the CBI data set, and is the only one 
recorded over the duration of the sample .  
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changing union presence to changes in short and medium-run settlement dispersion 
12. 
To address the issue of persistence in settlement behaviour we follow the same 
group over time. We construct a series of balanced panels of settlement groups who 
remain in the sample for five consecutive years
13. The sample frame is restricted to 
those groups party to an annual settlement, around 95% of all groups in each year. The 
time dimension is limited by the attrition rate over the sample.  The attrition rate 
between consecutive surveys is rather high at around 30% rising to around 50% if a 
five-year window is used
14.  Using five-year periods ensures that the sample size does 
not fall below 200 observations in each panel. Table A1 in the appendix provides more 
details. If groups are lost to the survey, efforts are made to retain the sample 
stratification by region and industry. The issue of attrition is important if it affects the 
outcome variables of concern, see Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1998). We 
return to this issue when we discuss our principal findings below.  
 
3.  Changes in Pay Dispersion and Settlement Persistence Over Time 
Our first step is to check whether the dispersion in individual pay levels that 
has emerged over the last twenty-five years in Britain is mirrored in a widening 
dispersion of company pay settlements. Table 1, together with Figure 1 and Table A2 
in the appendix, provide summary statistics for the real settlement distributions since 
1979.  While widening dispersion in pay levels in Britain began around this time, (see 
for example Machin 2003), the aggregate pattern of real settlement dispersion is 
                                                           
12.   If we use the nominal settlement distribution, this amounts to a lateral shift in the real wage 
distribution so that dispersion measures, but not relative inequality measures will be the same. 
 
12. Ingram (1995) finds little evidence of widespread differences between settlement averages in the 
panels and the corresponding whole sample figures in the relevant years. 
13. As a result only 2% of settlement groups remain in the sample for the entire period and only 25% 
remain for any consecutive eight observations. 
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cyclical and does not appear to be trended strongly.  
However, Table 1 and Figure 1 demonstrate that dispersion in wage settlements 
of unionised groups becomes significantly lower than settlement dispersion among and 
those of non-union groups at the onset of the economic recovery in 1993/94 and 
remains lower throughout the rest of the sample period. While the mean settlement 
appears to be similar across union and non-union groups over the sample period, 
dispersion among union groups starts to fall from 1993, while settlement dispersion for 
non-union groups remains broadly constant after this point. Since the sample 
proportion of unionised settlement groups falls from 0.62 to 0.23 between 1987 and 
2001, this finding is consistent with the idea that declining union presence may   
account for a wider overall settlement distribution than if union presence had remained 
steady. 
Settlement Persistence 
Our results indicate that there is increased dispersion between union and non-
union groups, so we turn now to dispersion within groups. The implications for 
inequality in the cross-sectional settlement distribution depend on how much 
movement within the distribution there is over time. Our next step is to investigate the 
evidence for relative wage settlement persistence within the distribution of settlements 
and to determine whether unionised and non-union groups differ in the degree of 
settlement persistence. There are several ways of capturing persistence. Table 2 reports 
the results of simple regressions of the real value of the settlement on a lagged value 
for each of the five-year panels: 
∆Wit+j = α + β ∆Wit + uit  i = 1, .. N groups   t = 1, ..4 time periods   (1) 
In this case, complete mobility and lack of any persistence in the real level of the 
settlement would imply that the coefficient β would equal zero. Complete immobility 
in the settlement pattern over time, so that the settlement distribution at time t is the  
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same as that in time t+i, would imply that β=1. We estimate (1) for the full sample and 
then the union and non-union sub-samples in each panel. 
  The results suggest that mobility across the pay distribution is quite rapid. The 
aggregate one-period ahead β coefficients that are significant, are in the range of 0.3 
but the four-period ahead β coefficients estimates are more volatile. It is apparent from 
the  β coefficients in the Table that persistence in settlements during the recession 
period 1989-1993 was much lower than at other times. So not only do recessions 
increase settlement dispersion, they appear to generate a rapid re-ordering of groups 
within the settlement distribution. 
There appear to be no systematic differences in the pattern of settlement 
movements within the union and non-union sub-samples. Settlement persistence in 
both unionised and non-unionised groups is lower during the recession. In other 
periods, wage settlement persistence in unionised groups is either higher, lower or the 
same as in non-unionised groups depending on which panel is chosen.  
These simple regressions do not take account of any changes in the set of all 
possible correlations afforded by the panel data. One way to begin to address this issue 
is to produce summary statistics using the set of autocorrelations in the data and in so 
doing try to determine whether the differential changes in settlement dispersion across 
union and non-union groups have been driven by permanent or transitory changes, or 
both. Permanent changes to the pattern of settlement dispersion require different 
explanations to transitory changes. The relatively limited length of our panels, required 
by the need to keep sample sizes from becoming too small, restricts us from 
undertaking a comprehensive modelling of the permanent and transitory components 
of the settlement, as demonstrated by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995) for the U.S. or 
Dickens (2000) for Great Britain using individual pay level data.  
Instead, in order to help corroborate whether the auto-covariance patterns in the  
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data have changed over time and whether they differ by union status, we follow 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995) in assuming that the settlement value at time t can be 
modelled simply as the sum of a group-specific, permanent component, µi  and a 
serially uncorrelated transitory component, νit, then: 
∆Wit = µi + νit       (2) 
In this case, if the variance of the permanent component is σ
2
µ  and that of the 
transitory component is σ
2
ν, then it is easy to show that the variance of settlements is 




ν, so the diagonal elements of the 




 15 Hence a simple OLS regression of the t*(t+1)/2 unique autocovariances, Cjt, 
from any panel j consisting of t time periods on a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1 if the observation is a settlement variance and 0 if it is an autocovariance 
between settlement values at times t and s, s≠t:  
   C jt = b0 + b1D + ejt       ( 3 )  
will give an estimate of σ
2
µ as the constant, b0, and an estimate of σ
2
ν for the slope, b1.  
To see whether these components have changed over time, we pool the 
variance/covariance data from all 11 five-year panels and allow the estimates of the 
permanent and transitory variances to change over time in the following way: 
   C jt = b0 + b1D + b2Time + b3D*Time + ejt    (4) 
The coefficient b2 gives the annual change in the permanent component of the 
settlement variance and the coefficient b3 gives the annual change in the transitory 
component of the settlement variance. To see whether these effects differ by union 
status we estimate (3) and (4) separately for unionised and non-union settlement 
groups. Table A3 gives the set of autocovariances and autocorrelation values for the 
union and non-union groups.  The autocovariances/autocorrelations are positive and do 
                                                           
15.   This is not true if there is autocorrelation in the transitory error component.  
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not decline significantly with lag length until t+4, which lends some support to the 
simple transitory/permanent model of settlements outlined above.
16 In passing, we note 
that our data suggest then that earnings levels in Britain may not be characterised by a 
simple unit root process, in which this year’s pay equals last year’s level plus a 
random, residual adjustment
17.  
  Column 1 of Table 3 suggests that around one quarter of the average aggregate 
private sector settlement variance is accounted for by a permanent component. The 
average variance, the sum of the coefficients on the constant and the slope, is indeed 
lower for unionised groups, (column 4), than non union groups, (column 7), but the 
average share of the permanent component is similar for the two groups, (21% in the 
union sample, 23% in the non-union sample).
18 Column 2 suggests that, for the private 
sector as a whole, there has been an upward trend in the permanent variance over time 
and a downward trend in the transitory variance.  Columns 5 and 8 suggest that the 
increase in the permanent component of dispersion stems primarily from the non-union 
sector, while the trend decline in transitory variance appears to be greater in the union 
sector. So, the decline in settlement dispersion among union groups observed in Figure 
1 is driven by transitory components. 
To check whether these observations are driven by the increased settlement 
dispersion that we observe during the 1990-93 recession, we add a cyclical variable - 
the annual percentage change in real g.d.p. at time t - and its interaction with the 
dummy variable D. This allows both the permanent and transitory component to vary 
across the economic cycle as well as over a longer period, proxied by the linear time 
                                                           
16.  This contrasts somewhat with the findings of Leonard (1989) and Abowd and Card (1994) or Baker 
(1997) who find negative 1
st order autocovariance and insignificant effects thereafter, using individual 
wage change data from the United States. 
 
16.  Since differencing a unit root in levels leads to a negative first order autocovariance and 
negative covariance at higher orders.  







ν) which is also equal to the autocorrelation coefficient at any two points in time.  
  15 
trend. In column 3 the interaction of the time trend with the diagonal component is no 
longer significant, but the interaction of D with the gdp term is, suggesting that 
cyclical variation can account for much of the apparent downward trend in the 
transitory variance. This suggests that the impact of a recession affects pay in different 
firms at different points in time. Some firms are able to pay high wages during certain 
recessionary years and others are not, depending on when the negative shock falls. 
However, this pattern is only temporary. In contrast, the coefficient on the time trend, 
the indicator of the growth in permanent variance, is not reduced when the cyclical 
variable is added. If anything, the estimated trend growth in permanent variance is now 
larger
19.  
The different persistence patterns across the unionised and non-union 
settlement groups also remain. The addition of the cyclical variables does not change 
the impression that the transitory variance fell among unionised groups over time with 
little change in the permanent component, (column 6). For the non-union groups,     
controlling for the cycle, the permanent component of the variance appears to have 
grown over time, (column 9). When the two groups are combined, non-union group 
effects dominate and so behavioural changes across this sector underlie the increase in 
the permanent component of dispersion for the whole sample, (column 3). The decline 
in the transitory variance among unionised groups is still not large enough to influence 
the aggregate dispersion pattern significantly. 
While falling transitory variance is consistent with the idea of a decline in 
leapfrogging behaviour among unionised groups, even by the end of the sample period, 
the permanent share of settlement variance is still smaller than the transitory variance. 
This suggests that, firms either find it difficult to, or choose not to, pursue distinctive 
                                                           
19. The covariances in the data are largest when gdp growth is at its lowest. If we use the unemployment 
rate as an alternative cyclical variable to the growth in gdp, which lags gdp growth by around 2 years, 
then in both the union and non-union samples the significance of the cyclical and trend components are 
reduced and the R
2 falls.   
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wage policies over long periods of time.  This pattern is also consistent with the 
sharing of transient rents in wage outcomes. 
Another way to capture mobility in the settlement distribution is to examine 
cumulative settlement outcomes over the medium term. The extent of mobility across 
the settlement distribution over the medium run is made apparent in Table 4, which 
summarises the number of times a settlement group appears in the top or bottom 
quartile of the pay distribution in each five-year panel.
20   In the first half of the sample 
period there is little difference in mobility across the respective settlement distributions 
of union and non-union groups. Around 1% of all groups are consistently in the top or 
bottom quartiles during the first half of the sample period and two thirds of groups 
appear in the top and bottom quartiles at least once. In the later years of the sample 
differences between the union and non-union samples begin to emerge. Some non-
union groups begin to appear more regularly in the top quartile of the non-union 
settlement distribution, which is consistent with the increased persistence among these 
groups observed in Table 3. The shares of non-union groups who appear at least once 
in the top and bottom quartiles do not, however, change. 
 To examine the implications of this pattern of settlements for pay levels we 
create a set of counterfactual level outcomes. The cumulative effect of annual pay 
settlements on implied wage levels over time is outlined in Table 5 which gives 
counterfactual and actual indices of the implied pay levels at the 10th, 50th and 90th 
percentiles of the cumulative real wage distribution for the five year cohorts.  Using a 
base year index of 100, if the settlement group had received the median settlement 
increase in each of the five years beginning 1987/88, then Table 5 shows that real 
earnings would have been some 3 percentage points higher by the end of the pay-round 
                                                           
20.  The indices of mobility as an equaliser of longer-term incomes outlined in Fields (2002) are 
difficult to apply in this context because of  negative real settlement values in the cross-sectional 
distribution. Also the lack of pay level data precludes definitive analysis as to whether inequality has 
risen or fallen.   
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1991/92. The real pay of those receiving settlements in the lowest decile in each year 
would be some 3 percentage points lower and that of the top decile 13 points higher 
over the period.   
These counterfactuals are of course an upper bound on the extent of earnings 
dispersion assuming as they do no mobility between pay quantiles.  The actual out-
turns indicate that the lack of persistence in settlements reduces the change in the 90-
10 differential by around 9 points to 16.6 points over the five years, with 
corresponding reductions of 4 to 5 points in the 90, 50th and 10th percentile implied 
levels.  Again the divergence between the union and non-union samples becomes 
apparent over time. In the early panels there is little difference between the union and 
non-union groups. At the end of the period, cumulative dispersion – as given by the 
90/10 differential - among non-union groups is much larger and driven by larger 
sustained increases at the top of the private sector wage distribution. It appears that 
certain non-union groups in the late 1990s were able to achieve a series of pay awards 
that kept them consistently toward the top of the pay distribution despite not being at 
the top of the settlement distribution in every year. 
Table 6 and Figure 3 summarise the difference between cross-section real 
settlement variance and the cumulative five-year distributions by union status. Both 
short and medium-term dispersion in settlements is significantly lower in the unionised 
sector than in the non-union sector by the end of the sample period. The absolute Gini 
measures in both the one year and the cumulative five year settlement distributions fall 
steadily over the sample period for the unionised sample. No such fall is observed 
among non-union groups. 
There are of course a number of factors that could help explain why settlement 
dispersion is lower for the unionised sector in the medium term as well as the short 
term. The data allow us to control for group size effects, industry (15 sectors), and  
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region (10 regions). As measures of dispersion we calculate the real value of the 
settlement relative to the median given firstly,  a one year window; and secondly,  a 
five year window, see Table 7. We then regress this variable on a union status dummy 
with and without the size, region and sector controls. The coefficient can be read as the 
estimated percentage point deviation from the median of unionised groups relative to 
non-union groups. The union presence dummy is negative and significant in the latter 
part of the sample period in the one year regressions, even allowing for variations 
across groups by employment size, sector and region and for random unobserved 
group effects, (column 3). The union dummy is also significant for the same periods 
when using a five year window, conditional on size, region and sector. This again 
suggests that unionised groups lower pay dispersion over the medium as well as the 
short term.  
Attrition in the panel is a problem if it leads to bias in the outcome variables of 
interest, in this case the dispersion of settlements. As one means of addressing this 
issue, Table A4 in the appendix reports the marginal effects from a set of probit 
regressions of the probability that a settlement group is present in each year that 
comprises a given five year panel. The covariates of interest are the average distance 
from the median of the settlement group, union status and an interaction term of the 
two. The Table shows that presence in the panel during the first half of the sample 
period was positively related to union status. However the settlement dispersion 
generally has no effect on attrition. Groups who drop out do not appear to be at 
different points in the settlement distribution over time compared to those groups who 
remain in the sample. The exception to this pattern occurs during the recession period 
of 1989-91. Unionised groups in particular who settled closer to the median were more 
likely to drop out during this period. If anything then, this suggests we may 
underestimate any union effects on dispersion at this time.   
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Declining Union Presence and Settlement Dispersion 
To assess the importance of the decline in union coverage over the sample 
period on the overall change in settlement dispersion over both the short and medium 
terms, we next present counterfactual estimates of what the 1997 short and medium 
term settlement dispersion would be holding everything else constant but using the 
1987 union share.  
We estimate a counterfactual real settlement variance based on the variance 
decomposition first used by Freeman (1980) and more recently by Card, Lemieux and 
Riddell, (2003): 
2 _ _
) ( * ) 1 ( * ) ( * ) 1 ( ) ( * ) (
union non union
union non union W W u u W Var u W Var u W Var
−




) ( * ) 1 ( * ] ( ) ( [ ) (
union non union
union non union union non W W u u W Var W Var u W Var
−
− − ∆ − ∆ − + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ =    (5) 
where u is the union share in each year. The second term is the within-group dispersion 
effect of unions and the third is the between-group dispersion effect on the variance. 
Card et al. (2003) argue that the counterfactual effect of unions on settlement 
dispersion – the difference between the observed variance and that which would 
prevail if all groups were non-union - can, under certain assumptions, be given by 
Var(∆W)-Var(∆W
non-union). We estimate (5) for the annual settlement variance in each 
of the five years of the final panel and then take the average. We also calculate (5) for 
the cumulative distribution over the same five year period.
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  Table 8 confirms that the union effect is to reduce dispersion in the medium 
term. The variance decomposition based on (5) suggests that the union effect on 
dispersion is somewhat cyclical, being weaker in recessionary periods. Based on   
annual variances averaged over five years, the union compression effect is around 16% 
                                                           
21. Wooden’s (2001) exploration of the effects of decentralisation on Australian wage levels finds that 
the dampening union effect is greater across rather than within establishments.  
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in both the first and the final five year periods, despite the large fall in unionisation 
over the period. This is because the difference in dispersion between union and non-
union sectors has grown at the same time as unionisation has fallen. The majority of 
the union effect on settlement variance comes from the within sector effect. So unions, 
as expected, influence the dispersion of settlements rather than the mean settlement 
level. Over the medium term the cumulative difference in dispersion between the 
unionised and non-union sectors is such that the union effect rises.  Between the first 
and last panels the medium-run union effect on cumulative settlement variance rises 
from 9 to 15%, the latter being close to the annual average effect.   
We use union shares from different years to construct the counterfactuals, all 
else constant, for both the short run and medium run real settlement variances for the 
five years beginning in 1997. Settlement variances would have been some 40% lower 
had the union share remained at its 1987 level. Based on these estimates the union 
effect on dispersion in the medium term is close to that over a one year period.  
 
4. Conclusion 
During a period when unions have been in numerical decline and wage 
inequality has increased, our evidence suggests that there is less dispersion in the 
distribution of wage settlements in the unionised sector. Since the last recession, 
settlement dispersion has fallen significantly among the (shrinking) union sector. 
Indeed the growing difference between union and non-union settlement dispersion 
explains why the union dampening effect on inequality in the settlement distribution 
remains, and may even have risen over the medium term compared to fifteen years 
ago, despite the declining union presence.  
By using the panel element of our data set we are able to follow movements 
across the settlement distribution over the medium term. This suggests that much of  
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the fall in union settlement dispersion is driven by transitory rather than permanent 
falls in the variance. For non-union groups, controlling for the cycle, the permanent 
component of the variance appears to have grown over time, offset by a fall in the 
transitory variance. What this suggests is that while we show that many groups do not 
appear to receive wage increases above or below the going rate over a sustained period 
of time, there has been more stability in recent years. It seems then that there may be 
more permanent winners and more permanent losers in the settlement rankings than in 
the past. Since this feature is common to both the union and non-union sectors, it 
seems an explanation that can encompass behaviour in both sectors may be required.  
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Figure 3. Changing Inequality in the Union and Non-Union Settlement 
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Table 1. Real Settlement Dispersion by Union Status, 1987/88-2001/02 
Pay Round  Mean Variance 90-10  Absolute  Gini  Kolm 
Index 
Union         
1987/88  2.1 4.0 3.5  0.986  2.153 
1988/89  0.0 4.5 4.6  1.024  2.189 
1989/90  0.1 5.7 4.5  1.199  5.125 
1990/91  -0.4  8.9    7.3  1.616  4.806 
1991/92  0.2 4.4 6.5  1.110  2.285 
1992/93  0.9  3.9    4.9  1.025  1.689 
1993/94  0.5 2.0 2.6 0.659 0.686 
1994/95 0.1  2.3  3.0 0.715  1.011 
1995/96 0.9  1.7  1.9 0.631  1.125 
1996/97  0.6  1.1    1.5  0.489  0.537 
1997/98 0.1  1.4  2.0 0.570  0.752 
1998/99 1.1  1.9  2.5 0.668  0.919 
1999/2000 0.3  1.4  2.2  0.652  0.861 
2000/01  0.8  1.3    2.0  0.621  0.744 
2001/02 1.4  0.9  2.0 0.509  0.549 
Non-Union         
1987/88  2.1 3.2 3.5  0.951  1.665 
1988/89  0 3.5  4.9  0.958  2.876 
1989/90  0 7.1  4.8  1.276  5.145 
1990/91  -0.6  7.8    7.0  1.497  4.479 
1991/92  0.3 5.3 7.0  1.187  2.391 
1992/93  0.9  3.3    4.8  0.974  1.513 
1993/94  0.5 2.7 3.9 0.847 1.056 
1994/95 0.2  4.5  3.5 0.994  1.405 
1995/96 0.8  3.3  3.0 0.850  1.435 
1996/97  0.7  2.9    3.0  0.827  1.238 
1997/98 0.1  3.3  2.3 0.808  1.296 
1998/99 1.1  3.8  5.0 0.952  1.458 
1999/2000 0.7  3.2  4.0  0.911  1.209 
2000/01  0.9  3.7    5.0  1.066  1.745 
2001/02 1.4  2.9  4.2 1.002  1.423 
Note: the Kolm index is based on choice parameter set to 1. Bootstrapped standard errors for absolute 
Gini (Kolm) coefficients are in range 0.035 to 0.046 (0.074 to 0.245) for the union sample and 0.044 to 
0.048 (0.093 to 0.253) for the non-union sample based on 1000 replications. The sample proportion of 
unionised groups is 0.62 in 1987, 0.31 in 1995 and 0.23 in 2001.  
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Table 2. Persistence in Real Wage Settlements Over time (five year panels) 
 Total  Non-Union  Union 
  t+1 t+4    t+1 t+4    t+1  t+4 
             
1987-91 0.382** 0.105    0.462** 0.117   0.315**  0.107 
  (0.059) (0.057)  (0.095) (0.095)  (0.069)  (0.165) 
             
1988-92  0.332**  0.127**  0.333** 0.089   0.332**  0.175** 
  (0.054) (0.046)  (0.130) (0.060)  (0.135)  (0.086) 
             
1989-93 0.105  0.069**    0.066 0.067    0.170  0.071 
  (0.070) (0.033)  (0.114) (0.049)  (0.139)  (0.055) 
             
1990-94  -0.018  0.021    -0.031  0.009      0.007   0.047 
  (0.038) (0.032)  (0.045) (0.033)  (0.064)  (0.070) 
             
1991-95 0.209** 0.053    0.238** 0.080  0.111  -0.026 
  (0.042) (0.038)  (0.063) (0.042)  (0.081)  (0.075) 
             
1992-96 0.071  0.109**    0.057 0.073    0.120  0.221** 
  (0.048) (0.048)  (0.094) (0.095)  (0.084)  (0.093) 
             
1993-97  0.306**  0.153**  0.238** 0.099   0.531**  0.330** 
  (0.057) (0.056)  (0.080) (0.072)  (0.185)  (0.133) 
             
1994-98 0.292** 0.086    0.301** 0.133   0.246**  -0.102 
  (0.054) (0.051)  (0.116) (0.116)  (0.155)  (0.077) 
             
1995-99 0.390** 0.033    0.369**   0.031   0.513**  -0.052 
  (0.055) (0.058)  (0.105) (0.095)  (0.204)  (0.084) 
             
1996-2000  0.302**  0.257**  0.282** 0.253**  0.545**  0.147 
  (0.050) (0.066)  (0.063) (0.120)  (0.199)  (0.089) 
             
1997-2001  0.284**  0.341**  0.277** 0.320    0.218  0.265 
.  (0.070) (0.077)  (0.121) (0.188)  (0.155)  (0.245) 
Note: coefficients are slope estimates from regression of level of real settlement in year t+i , (i= 1 or 4), 
on real settlement in year t. Robust standard errors in brackets. ** denotes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 3. Summary Covariance Regressions for Real Annual Settlement (11  five year panels) 
 Total  Union  Non-Union 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Constant 0.628**  0.361**  0.468**  0.417**  0.683**  0.735**  0.677**  0.294*  0.384** 
 (0.119)  (0.144)  (0.120)  (0.075)  (0.120) (0.108) (0.081) (0.165)  (0.141) 
Diagonal 2.182**  2.828**  3.215**  1.531**  2.940**  3.239**  2.248**  3.096**  3.544** 
 (0.119)  (0.251)  (0.207)  (0.130)  (0.208) (0.187) (0.136) (0.286)  (0.244) 
Time Trend     0.045**   0.072**    -0.044*  -0.031     0.064**   0.087** 
   (0.021)  (0.022)    (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.024)  (0.023) 
  -0.107**  -0.023      -0.235**  -0.168**    -0.103*  -0.004  Diagonal*Time Trend 
 (0.037)  (0.033)    (0.031)  (0.029)    (0.042)  (0.039) 
% ∆ GDP     -0.114**      -0.056      -0.096** 
     (0.042)      (0.037)      (0.048) 
   -0.388**      -0.301**      -0.451**  Diagonal* ∆GDP  
   (0.066)      (0.060)      (0.078) 
                  
R
2 0.672  0.689  0.811  0.461  0.702  0.785  0.672  0.688  0.796 
Note: standard errors in brackets. Sample size is 165 in each case 
 
 
Identify why/how columns in each section vary  
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Table 4. Mobility in the Settlement Distribution 























1987-91    
All 67.5  68.5 14.6 18.3 1.0 1.5
Union 67.4  68.0 18.0 17.4 0.6  1.1
Non-Union 68.1 69.3 9.6* 20.1 1.8  1.8
1988-92    
All 64.0  67.8 16.1 15.8 2.4 1.7
Union 65.0  66.1 18.9 13.9 1.7  0
Non-Union 62.5 70.5 11.6* 18.8 3.6  4.6*
1989-93    
All 66.1  68.8 13.2 15.6 0.9 0.9
Union 66.7  67.2 11.7 13.9 0.6  1.1
Non-Union 65.4 70.6 15.0 17.6 1.3  0.7
1990-94    
All 63.4  69.6 12.8 18.5 0.9  0
Union 63.0  68.8 12.7 20.8 1.2  0
Non-Union 63.8 70.6 12.9 16.0 0.6  0
1991-95    
All 64.5  68.4 15 19.7 1.6 0.8
Union 63.4  73.1 13.1 17.9 0.7  0.7
Non-Union 65.1  65.5* 16.2 20.9 2.1  0.9
    
    
1994-98    
All 56.8  73.5 19.4 20.9 1.8  0
Union 58  73 16.0 15.0 2.0  0
Non-Union 56.3 73.8 20.8 23.3* 1.7  0
1995-99    
All 57.5  73.2 18.5 20 2.1 0.3
Union 42.4  75 8.7 21.7 1.1  0
Non-Union 63.5*  72.5 22.3* 19.3 2.6  0.1
1996-2000    
All 58.3  73.3 16.7 16 3.8 0.3
Union 50  79.7 4.7 17.2 0  0
Non-Union 60.7 71.4 20.1* 15.6 4.9*  0.1
1997-2001    
All 58.6  68.2 18.6 18.6 3.6 0.1
Union 30.6  71.4 2.0 20.4 2.0  0
Non-Union 66.7*  67.3 23.4* 18.1 4.1  0.1
 Note: * indicates union and non-union proportions are significantly different from each other.  
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Table 5. Real and Counterfactual Evolution of Implied Pay Levels based on Real 
Settlement Distribution 
 
a. 1986-91  
 Counterfactual  Level  Actual 
       Non-Union  Union 
Year  10    50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 
1986  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1987  100.7 101.9 104.1 100.8 101.9 104.4 100.4 101.8 104.2 
1988  98.9  101.5 106.3 99.1  102.0 105.1 99.2  101.5 106.0 
1989  97.2  101.7 108.8 97.6  101.9 107.9 97.6  101.8 108.2 
1990  94.4  101.8 111.2 97.4  102.1 108.0 95.6  101.6 109.1 
1991  92.7  102.0 113.2 95.8  101.6 108.9 95.1 102.0  109.9 
 
b. 1990-95  
 Counterfactual  Level  Actual 
       Non-Union  Union 
Year  10    50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 
1990  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1991  98.9  100.7 102.3 98.9  100.6 102.4 98.9  100.7 102.3 
1992  98.3  101.9 105.1 98.7  101.8 105.1 98.4  101.6 104.4 
1993  97.8  102.4 106.9 98.7  102.2 105.8 98.4  102.2 105.9 
1994  97.0  102.4 108.3 98.1  102.2 107.4 97.8  102.2 106.7 
1995  97.0  103.3 110.6 98.5  103.2 108.6 98.3 103.2  108.1 
 
c. 1995-2000 
 Counterfactual  Level  Actual 
       Non-Union  Union 
Year  10    50 90 10 50 90 10 50 90 
1995  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1996  99.7  100.6 102.6 99.3  100.6 102.9 99.9  100.6 101.5 
1997  98.9  100.6 104.3 99.1  100.9 104.0 99.9  100.6 101.2 
1998  98.7  101.6 107.0 99.2  101.9 107.4 100.2 101.7 102.9 
1999  97.7  102.2 109.7 99.3  102.4 109.9 99.6  102.0 104.1 
2000  96.9  103.0 113.3 99.2  103.1 112.9 99.2 103.1  106.1 
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Table 6. Cumulative Real Settlement Dispersion by Union Status, (five year 
panels) 
Pay Round  Mean of cumulative 
distribution 




Union         
1987-91  2.3  31.0  14.0  3.07  (0.19)  .867 
1988-92  1.6  33.4  13.3  3.18  (0.22)  .882 
1989-93  2.3  22.5  10.7  2.61  (0.18)  .838 
1990-94  2.4  18.1  10.5  2.34  (0.17)  .771 
1991-95  3.2  14.4  8.3  1.96  (0.18)  .651 
1992-96  3.2  17.7  7.9  1.99  (0.24)  .601 
1993-97  2.7  21.6  6.6  1.97  (0.33)  .575 
1994-98  2.9  12.7  5.1  1.54  (0.26)  .508 
1995-99  3.1  8.7  5.2  1.41  (0.20)  .471 
1996-2000  2.5  11.3  6.6  1.70  (0.23)  .539 
1997-2001  2.7  7.5  5.0  1.34  (0.23)  .439 
Non-Union         
1987-91  2.5  35.7  14.4  3.25  (0.27)  1.04 
1988-92  1.6  32.6  13.7  3.14  (0.22)  .994 
1989-93  1.9  28.9  12.3  2.90  (0.19)  .952 
1990-94  2.5  20.7  12.3  2.52  (0.14)  .866 
1991-95  3.4  16.8  10.5  2.25  (0.12)  .742 
1992-96  3.6  15.0  8.4  2.02  (0.15)  .683 
1993-97  2.7  23.3  8.5  2.35  (0.19)  .712 
1994-98  4.1  26.6  10.6  2.61  (0.19)  .757 
1995-99  4.5  29.6  11.0  2.70  (0.21)  .794 
1996-2000  4.6  40.3  12.8  3.10  (0.26)  .875 
1997-2001  6.0  45.8  10.9  3.14  (0.35)  .904 
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Table 7. OLS Estimates of Union Effect on Cumulative Pay Distribution 






five year window 
 
Payround          
1987/88 -0.094  -0.122  -0.146  -0.259  -0.383 
 (0.160)  (0.151)  (0.087)  (0.458)  (0.476) 
1988/89 -0.001  0.048  0.012    0.179  0.236 
 (0.161)  (0.164)  (0.086)  (0.428)  (0.450) 
1989/90 0.007  0.103  -0.027  -0.248  -0.086 
 (0.153)  (0.151)  (0.077)  (0.362)  (0.377) 
1990/91 0.027  0.054  -0.055  -0.146  -0.229 
 (0.175)  (0.187)  (0.075)  (0.313)  (0.310) 
1991/92 -0.291*  -0.178  -0.070  -0.424  -0.420 
 (0.125)  (0.157)  (0.073)  (0.291)  (0.330) 
1992/93 -0.144  -0.118  -0.110  -0.147  -0.256 
  (0.104) (0.102)  (0.078)  (0.349) (0.336) 
1993/94  -0.171 -0.173  -0.091  -0.612 -0.281 
 (0.106)  (0.108)  (0.091)  (0.447)  (0.398) 
1994/95 -0.161  0.058    -0.236**  -1.570**  -1.100** 
 (0.140)  (0.142)  (0.100)  (0.395)  (0.384) 
1995/96 -0.411**  -0.274**  -0.286**  -1.730**  -1.230* 
 (0.119)  (0.119)  (0.093)  (0.368)  (0.372) 
1996/97 -0.558**  -0.550**  -0.298**  -1.910**  -1.320** 
 (0.151)  (0.153)  (0.131)  (0.459)  (0.508) 
1997/98 -0.536*  -0.226  -0.495*  -2.370**  -2.100** 
 (0.144)  (0.133)  (0.194)  (0.542)  (0.704) 
          
Employment 
controls 
No Yes  Yes  No Yes 
Industry 
controls 
No Yes  Yes  No Yes 
Region controls  No Yes  Yes  No Yes 
Note: dependent variable is absolute deviation from median (measured in percentage points). 
Coefficient is union status dummy variable from OLS regression. Robust standard errors in brackets. * 
indicates significance at 5% level 
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Table 8.  The Effect of Declining Union Presence on Short and Medium-Run Settlement Dispersion 
    Annual (five year average)  five year cumulative distribution 




















1987  0.62  3.7  -0.630 0.012  -0.618  32.7  -2.919 0.009  -2.910 
                
1992  0.33  1.8  -0.109  0.004 -0.105  16.0  0.889  0.027 0.862 
                
1997  0.20  3.3  -0.610 0.075  -0.535  39.9  -7.702 1.775  -5.927 
                
Counterfactual                
1997 with 1987 
union share 
  2.1       25.7      
1997 with 1992 
union share 
  3.  1       37.1      
Note: The within-group effect is given by  ) ( ) ( [
N u W Var W Var u ∆ − ∆  and the between-group effect is given by 
union non union
W W u u
−
∆ − ∆ −
_ _
( * ) 1 ( *  in equation (5)  
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No. of times  group 
appears in dataset 
(% of total) 
 
1979  927 0.388 0.498 0.947 1  3.9
 
1980  1357 0.279 0.498 0.92 2  5.3
 
1981  1430 0.278 0.481 0.903 3  5.7
 
1982  1307 0.243 0.49 0.888 4  6.9
 
1983  1361 0.284 0.526 0.886 5  6.6
 
1984  1246 0.298 0.498 0.861 6  7.0
 
1985  1156 0.338 0.484 0.863 7  7.6
 
1986  1174 0.379 0.506 0.855 8  6.8
 
1987
*  1264 0.333 0.453 0.845 9  6.5
 
1988  1181 0.302 0.447 0.826 10  5.9
 
1989  1467 0.334 0.479 0.817 11  5.4
 
1990  1424 0.253 0.484 0.801 12  4.7
 
1991  1602 0.285 0.436 0.78 13  4.1
 
1992  1662 0.297 0.545 0.768 14  4.0
1993 1673  0.305 0.493 0.747 15  3.4
1994 1575  0.232 0.518 0.714 16  3.2
1995 1739  0.365 0.531 0.692 17  2.8
1996 1357  0.289 0.458 0.638 18  2.9
1997 1502  0.346 0.622 0.622 19  3.0
1998 1340  0.387   0.592 20  1.9
1999 1277  0.366   0.555 21  1.2
2000 1336  0.485   0.485 22  1.4
Note: * manufacturing only before this date  
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Table A2. Real Settlement Dispersion, 1979-2001 
Pay Round  Mean  Variance  90-10  Absolute Gini  Kolm  
Manufacturing         
1979/80  -2.7 20.2 8.6  2.186 4.179 
1980/81  -4.1 8.9 7.5  1.460  2.483 
1981/82  -3.6 7.8 5.1  1.448  2.698 
1982/83  0.8 5.7 4.6 1.284  3.424 
1983/84  1.0 2.0 3.6 0.955  2.199 
1984/85  0.6 3.8  3  1.038  2.333 
1985/86  1.9 4.7 3.6 1.187  3.162 
1986/87  1.3 2.6 3.1 0.845  1.822 
1987/88  2.0 3.5 3.6 0.936  1.989 
1988/89  -0.1 4.0 4.4  0.965  2.263 
1989/90  0.1 5.0 4.5 1.158  4.715 
1990/91  -0.6  7.9    7.1  1.521  4.549 
1991/92  0.2 4.3 6.1 1.073  2.202 
1992/93  0.8  3.1    4.5  0.933  1.502 
1993/94  0.4 4.9 2.8 0.705  0.836 
1994/95 0.1  2.7 3 0.787  1.151 
1995/96 0.8  2.2  2.2 0.700  1.171 
1996/97  0.5  1.8    2.2  0.642  1.000 
1997/98  0    2.0  2.2  0.647  1.087 
1998/99 0.7  2.4 4 0.772  1.189 
1999/2000 0.3  1.8  4  0.737 1.019 
2000/01  0.5  3.3    4  0.798  1.165 
2001/02 1.2  2.0  3.6 0.714  0.900 
Whole Economy         
1987/88  2.1 3.7 3.5 0.969  1.986 
1988/89   0  4.2  4.7  0.999  2.515 
1989/90  0 6.3  4.5  1.235  5.145 
1990/91  -0.5  8.4    7  1.559  4.465 
1991/92  0.2 4.9 6.5 1.156  2.348 
1992/93  0.9  3.5    4.8  0.992  1.578 
1993/94  0.5 2.5  3.25 0.792  0.956 
1994/95 0.2  3.8 3 0.909  1.293 
1995/96 0.8  1.7  2.8 0.789  1.360 
1996/97  0.6  2.4    2.8  0.739  1.089 
1997/98 0.1  2.7  2.2 0.744  1.172 
1998/99 1.1  3.4 4 0.888  1.359 
1999/2000 0.6  2.9  3.3  0.861 1.136 
2000/01  0.9  5.0    3.5  0.981  1.591 
2001/02 1.6  4.1  3.4 0.896  1.262 
Note: the Kolm index is based on choice parameter set to 1. Bootstrapped standard errors for absolute 
Gini (Kolm) coefficients are in range 0.035 to 0.046 (0.074 to 0.245) for the union sample and 0.044 to 
0.048 (0.093 to 0.253) for the non-union sample based on 1000 replications. The sample proportion of 
unionised groups is 0.62 in 1987, 0.31 in 1995 and 0.23 in 2001.  
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Table A3. Autocovariance and Autocorrelation Patterns in Settlements  
Year t  t+1  t+2  t+3  t+4 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Union        
1987/88  2.72*  0.86* 1.13*  1.04* 0.29 0.30* 0.38* 0.27*  0.11 
  (0.50)  (0.16) (0.24)  (0.27) (0.19)      
1988/89  2.90*  0.97* 1.52*  0.44* 0.51* 0.34* 0.36*  0.15   0.20* 
  (0.37)  (0.37) (0.41)  (0.21) (0.24)      
1989/90  3.50*  0.60 0.46*  0.34 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.11 
  (0.67)  (0.49) (0.21)  (0.21) (0.18)      
1990/91  5.40*  0.04  0.90*   0.22   0.25   0.01  0.31*  0.08  0.07 
  (0.87)  (0.34) (0.29)  (0.26) (0.39)      
1991/92  2.12*  0.24 0.45*  0.07 -0.05 0.14 0.27* 0.03 -0.03 
  (0.44)  (0.16) (0.14)  (0.31) (0.16)      
1992/93  1.50*   0.18  0.14  0.33*   0.33*  0.13 0.07  0.23*  0.24* 
  (0.27)  (0.14) (0.13)  (0.10) (0.13)      
1993/94  1.49*  0.79* 0.40 0.50 0.49*  0.41* 0.28* 0.40* 0.35* 
 (0.36)  (0.34) (0.29)  (0.30) (0.25)      
1994/95 1.91*  0.47 0.69*  0.49 -0.20  0.31* 0.56* 0.34* -0.13 
 (0.57)  (0.37) (0.32)  (0.38) (0.14)      
1995/96 0.96*  0.50 0.51  0.16*  -0.05  0.55* 0.57*  0.15  -0.04 
 (0.44)  (0.39) (0.35)  (0.07) (0.09)      
1996/97 1.03*  0.56 0.12  0.04 0.15  0.55* 0.12  0.02  0.11 
 (0.47)  (0.41) (0.18)  (0.15) (0.12)      
1997/98 0.47*  0.10 0.09  0.02 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.03 0.22 
 (0.16)  (0.07) (0.05)  (0.12) (0.11)      
Non-Union          
1987/88  3.43*  1.58* 1.41*  1.10* 0.40 0.41* 0.36* 0.24*  0.12 
  (0.79)  (0.46) (0.42)  (0.44) (0.35)      
1988/89  3.92*  1.31* 0.37  0.69* 0.35 0.35* 0.08 0.19* 0.12 
  (1.08)  (0.36) (0.60)  (0.30) (0.25)      
1989/90  4.19*  0.28 0.91*  0.60* 0.28 0.05 0.25*  0.21* 0.12 
  (0.80)  (0.48) (0.30)  (0.25) (0.20)      
1990/91  5.93*  -0.18 0.73*  -0.21 0.05 -0.04 0.19* -0.07  0.02 
  (0.94)  (0.32) (0.33)  (0.22) (0.19)      
1991/92  3.54*  0.84* 0.13  0.40* 0.28 0.28* 0.06 0.16* 0.12 
  (0.42)  (0.23) (0.18)  (0.13) (0.15)      
1992/93  2.40*  0.14 -0.03  0.77 0.17 0.06 -0.02  0.29* 0.08 
  (0.40)  (0.22) (0.16)  (0.52) (0.21)      
1993/94  1.96*  0.47 0.42*  0.57 0.20 0.21* 0.18* 0.26*  0.09 
 (0.32)  (0.16) (0.18)  (0.35) (0.15)      
1994/95 2.57* 0.78* 0.83*  1.25* 0.34 0.27* 0.31* 0.46*  0.14 
 (0.67)  (0.23) (0.19)  (0.66) (0.36)      
1995/96 2.48* 0.92* 0.62*  0.55*   0.08 0.34* 0.23* 0.22*  0.03 
 (0.44)  (0.28) (0.25)  (0.25) (0.24)      
1996/97 4.09* 1.16* 0.59  1.12*  1.03*  0.32* 0.17* 0.34* 0.24* 
 (1.05)  (0.31) (0.42)  (0.28) (0.42)      
1997/98 3.50*  0.97 1.24*  1.50* 1.12 0.28* 0.37* 0.38* 0.27* 
 (1.00)  (0.55) (0.42)  (0.73) (0.65)      
Note: Standard errors in brackets calculated following Abowd & Card (1989) and Dickens (2000) 
* significant at 5% level 
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Appendix Table A4. Probability of Presence in Five year Panel and Settlement 
Dispersion 


















87 -0.009  -0.010  0.159**  -0.009  -0.004  0.146** 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
88 -0.006  -0.009  0.149**  -0.002  -0.006  0.128** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
89 -0.003  -0.021**  0.169**  -0.001  -0.021**  0.160** 
 (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) 
90   0.023**  -0.054**  0.217**   0.023**  -0.049**  0.202** 
 (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.014) 
91 0.005  -0.047**  0.187**    0.007  -0.043**  0.171** 
 (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.018) 
92 -0.010  -0.016  0.121**  -0.009  -0.014  0.114** 
 (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.020) 
93  -0.009  -0.009  0.028    -0.009  -0.012  0.027   
 (0.006)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.006) (0.016) (0.021) 
94  -0.007  -0.015  0.034    -0.008  -0.017  0.035   
 (0.006)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.006) (0.019) (0.022) 
95 -0.002  -0.025  0.050**  -0.001  -0.027  0.063** 
 (0.006)  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.006) (0.018) (0.023) 
96   0.007  -0.041**  0.038*   0.009  -0.044**  0.049** 
 (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.006) (0.018) (0.024) 
97  -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.013 0.002     
 (0.006)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.006) (0.021) (0.023) 
Note: The table shows the marginal effects from a set of probit regressions of the probability that a 
settlement group is present in each year that comprises a given five-year panel. 